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I. INTRODUCTION
 When faced with the risk of losing one’s own life and liberty, a plea bargain 
provides a defendant with reasonable certainty of the outcome and sentence as 
opposed to the uncertainty, risk, and gamble that exists in pursuing a trial.1 The U.S. 
Constitution provides defendants with critical protections, including the right to due 
process.2 Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, due process requires that a defendant 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his plea agreement.3 In exchange for 
the certainty of a sentence pursuant to a plea bargain, a defendant waives several 
fundamental constitutional rights, including the right to a trial by jury, the right to 
confront his or her accusers, the right to raise a defense, and the right to assistance of 
counsel.4 In New York, a defendant may also be required as part of his plea agreement 
to waive his right to appeal the sentence.5
 New York court sentencing judges must exercise sound judicial discretion with 
respect to plea agreements and should consider such factors as the “[i]ntegrity of the 
criminal justice system in relation to the plea bargaining process as well as in relation 
to its protective, retributive, deterrent and rehabilitative aspects.”6
A trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before 
pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its 
consequences . . . . Although the court is not required to engage in any 
particular litany when allocuting the defendant, due process requires that the 
1. People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d 340, 346 (1980) (“[A] defendant who pleads guilty waives a number of 
valuable constitutional rights in order to obtain reasonable assurance of certainty rather than gamble the 
possibility of a not guilty verdict against the heavier punishment, the greater anxiety and, in some cases 
at least, the greater expense, involved in a full trial.”). The Oscar-winning movie Heaven Can Wait 
provides a poignant illustration of the dire consequences of making a decision based on incomplete 
information. The film is about an angel who chooses certainty over chance for an individual he is 
responsible for watching over. See Heaven Can Wait (Paramount Pictures 1978). Believing that the 
film’s protagonist, Joe Pendelton (played by Warren Beatty), will meet his death in a horrifying and 
painful head-on collision while biking through a mountain tunnel, the angel brings on Joe’s death 
moments before the accident. Id. The angel elected the certainty of death over taking the chance that 
Joe would severely suffer in the accident. Id. The angel’s belief that Joe would have been killed, however, 
was faulty. In fact, Joe would have survived the accident and would not have been injured. Id. The 
angel’s mistake led to troublesome consequences for the protagonist. Id. Like the angel in Heaven Can 
Wait, who did not have the stomach to gamble the risk of Joe dying in a horrible accident, defendants 
pursue similar opportunities in the plea bargain process in order to avoid the potential for “heavier 
punishment, the greater anxiety and . . . the greater expense, involved in a full trial.” McConnell, 49 
N.Y.2d at 346.
2. U.S. Const. amend. V.
3. Duperry v. Kirk, 563 F. Supp. 2d 370, 385 (D. Conn. 2008) (“It is axiomatic that a defendant pleading 
guilty must do so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily in order to pass constitutional muster. That is 
because, by pleading guilty, a defendant accepts significant consequences and waives several important 
constitutional rights—namely, the right against self-incrimination, the right to confront one’s accusers, 
and the right to a trial by jury.” (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969))).
4. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 –44.
5. People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 5 (1989).
6. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d at 346.
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record must be clear that the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice 
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant . . . .7
 In considering whether to accept a plea agreement, a defendant balances the 
benefit of gaining certainty of his punishment obtained through a plea against the 
risk of waiving several constitutional rights and the probability and likely outcome of 
being found guilty at trial.8 It is axiomatic that the plea bargain process hinges on a 
defendant having “a reasonable assurance of certainty” of the outcome of the plea 
agreement.9 Additionally, sentencing conditions must be consistent with due process 
requirements.10 Conditions associated with guilty pleas must “not amount to 
overreaching or a denial of a defendant’s entitlement to fundamental fairness.”11 But 
when a defendant enters into a plea bargain with incomplete information in violation 
of his due process rights, he can assert that his plea bargain was invalid because it did 
not meet fundamental due process requirements.12
 In People v. Harnett, the New York Court of Appeals (the “Court of Appeals”) 
held that David Harnett’s plea to the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree was 
made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, even though he was not informed that 
entering a plea would subject him to the provisions of New York’s Sex Offender 
Management and Treatment Act (SOMTA) and potential civil confinement after 
his prison term.13 The defendant, David M. Harnett (“Harnett”), asserted that the 
trial court did not advise him of this prior to his plea, and therefore violated his right 
to due process.14 SOMTA provides that a defendant could be subject to civil 
7. People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242, 245 (2005) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d at 346 (“[A] defendant who pleads guilty waives a number of valuable 
constitutional rights in order to obtain reasonable assurance of certainty rather than gamble the 
possibility of a not guilty verdict against the heavier punishment, the greater anxiety and, in some cases 
at least, the greater expense, involved in a full trial.”). These constitutional rights include “[t]he privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment[,] . . . the right to trial by jury[,] . . . [and] the right to confront one’s 
accusers.” 1 New York Criminal Practice § 12.07(5) (2d ed. 2011).
9. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d at 346; see also Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d at 7 (“The plea bargain . . . enables the parties 
to avoid the delay and uncertainties of trial and appeal and permits swift certain punishment of law 
violators with sentences tailored to the circumstances of the case at hand . . . .” (citations omitted)).
10. See People v. Parker, 711 N.Y.S.2d 656, 661 (4th Dep’t 2000).
11. People v. Miller, 434 N.Y.S.2d 36, 37 (2d Dep’t 1980) (finding that the defendant’s rights were not 
violated after he accepted an offer for a concurrent sentence for two felony counts in exchange for a 
withdrawal of an omnibus motion and entering a guilty plea).
12. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
13. See People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200 (2010). Though the specific charges and acts are not available, 
pursuant to section 130.65 of New York Penal Law, sexual abuse in the first degree is defined as follows: 
A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree when he or she subjects another 
person to sexual contact: 1.  By forcible compulsion; or 2.  When the other person is 
incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or 3. When the other person 
is less than eleven years old.
 N.Y. Penal Law § 130.65 (McKinney 2011).
14. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 204. 
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confinement or strict and intensive supervision after he has served a prison term for 
a sex offense.15 The Court of Appeals concluded that the possibility of civil 
confinement under SOMTA proceedings was a collateral and not a direct 
consequence of Harnett’s plea and, therefore, that the trial court had no requirement 
to disclose this to him in the plea bargain process.16 The Court of Appeals also 
found that in this instance, notions of fundamental fairness did not apply because the 
defendant did not make a factual showing that his lawyer did not disclose SOMTA 
to him and that SOMTA would have been a critical factor in his decision to enter his 
guilty plea.17
 This case comment makes three contentions. First, the court incorrectly 
concluded that SOMTA was a collateral consequence of entering a guilty plea to a 
sex offense crime because the court ignored the language and intent of SOMTA, 
which provides that criminal and civil proceedings for sex offenders are to follow an 
“integrated approach.”18 Second, irrespective of the classification of the consequence 
of SOMTA as either “collateral” or “direct,” the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in 
Padilla v. Kentucky challenges the use of this categorical approach and raises 
constitutional considerations in determining mandatory disclosures by a trial court to 
criminal defendants.19 Third, the court’s consideration of fundamental fairness both 
underestimates the potential severity and weight of SOMTA proceedings in a 
defendant’s decision to enter a plea bargain and puts the onus on the defendant to 
anticipate the impact of SOMTA as a consequence of his voluntary plea.20 Based on 
these contentions, this case comment argues that the court incorrectly held that the 
defendant’s plea in Harnett was valid and that the trial court did not violate his right 
to due process. A defendant’s constitutional right to due process is violated when he 
enters a guilty plea in exchange for a sentence without knowing that he potentially is 
subject to such severe consequences, including the potential for indefinite civil 
confinement or strict supervision, as a result of SOMTA’s proceedings.21
15. See generally N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.01 (McKinney 2011). 
16. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206–08. The court rather strangely suggests that the defendant may have won his 
argument had he “moved to withdraw his plea” by establishing that he did not know about SOMTA, 
and that had he known about SOMTA, it “would have been a significant factor in the evaluation of a 
plea bargain.” Id.
17. Id. at 208.
18. Mental Hyg. § 10.01(a).
19. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481–82 (2010).
20. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d. at 203–07.
21. Id. at 206. “By pleading guilty, defendant exposed himself to the possibility that he would be confined 
after expiration of his prison sentence, perhaps indefinitely.” Id. at 210 (Ciparick, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added); see also State v. Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d 644, 647 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2011) (“Involuntary civil 
confinement  [pursuant to Article 10] may entail  indefinite  confinement, [which] could be a more 
intrusive exercise of state power than incarceration following a criminal conviction.” (alterations in 
original) (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Spitzer, No. 07 Civ. 
2935 (GEL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85163, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007), aff ’d sub nom. Mental 
Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Paterson, No. 07-5548-cv, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4942 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2009))); 
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II. HARNETT ’S PRODEDURAL HISTORY AND THE COURT’S RATIONALE
 On March 13, 2008, the New York State Supreme Court, Schenectady County 
(the “County Court”), issued a judgment against Harnett, convicting him of the 
crime of sexual abuse in the first degree based on his plea of guilty.22 In exchange for 
a guilty plea, Harnett waived his constitutional rights to due process, including the 
right to a trial by jury, the right to confront his accusers, the right to raise a defense, 
and the right to assistance of counsel.23 He also waived his right to appeal and was 
sentenced to a seven-year prison term, with ten years of post-release supervision.24 
The County Court also entered a fifteen-year order of protection in favor of the 
victim.25 Harnett appealed this judgment to the Supreme Court of New York, 
Appellate Division, Third Department (the “Third Department”), contending that 
his plea agreement should be invalid because he did not knowingly, intelligently, or 
voluntarily enter the plea.26 Harnett asserted that the trial court did not advise him 
prior to his plea that his admission to a sex offense conviction would automatically 
subject him to the provisions of SOMTA.27 SOMTA proceedings provide that 
Harnett could be subject to civil confinement or strict and intensive supervision after 
he has served his prison term.28 The Third Department concluded that the disclosure 
of SOMTA proceedings was a collateral and not a direct consequence of his plea 
and, therefore, the trial court had no obligation or requirement to disclose SOMTA 
proceedings to Harnett in the plea bargain process.29 The Third Department’s 
conclusion was based on the finding that SOMTA proceedings were “entirely 
separate from and independent of the original criminal action,” and that, because 
factors specific to a defendant were in the SOMTA proceedings, it could not “be 
reasonably said that the potential for the future civil confinement or intensive 
supervision of defendant is an immediate, definite or automatic result of his guilty 
plea.”30
 Defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals on the grounds that he 
did not enter into the plea agreement knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because 
People v. Nieves, 896 N.Y.S.2d 644, 593 n.2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2010) (“Article 10 of the Mental 
Hygiene Law, enacted by the Legislature in 2007, authorizes certain convicted sex offenders to be 
subject to indefinite civil confinement in a secure mental health facility or indefinite strict and intensive 
supervision and treatment in the community upon a finding by a jury that such an offender suffers from 
a ‘Mental Abnormality’ as defined by the statute.”).
22. People v. Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d 614, 615 (3d Dep’t 2010), aff ’d, 16 N.Y.3d 200 (2011).
23. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–44 (1969).
24. Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d at 615. 
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 615–16.
30. Id. at 616.
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the trial court failed to disclose that he would be subject to SOMTA proceedings 
before he entered his plea.31 Under SOMTA, any person who is qualified as a 
detained sex offender pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law section 10.03(g) is 
subject to the provisions of the statute.32 SOMTA proceedings provide that 
individuals convicted of a sex offense could be subject to indefinite confinement or 
strict and intensive supervision.33
 Harnett argued that the trial court’s failure to inform him that he would be 
subjected to SOMTA proceedings as a result of his conviction “invalidated his plea 
because (1) they are direct consequences of the plea, and (2) whether direct or 
31. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 204 (2011).
32. Section 10.03(g) of the New York Mental Hygiene statute provides: 
“Detained sex offender” means a person who is in the care, custody, control, or 
supervision of an agency with jurisdiction, with respect to a sex offense or designated 
felony, in that the person is either:
(1)  A person who stands convicted of a sex offense as defined in subdivision (p) of this 
section, and is currently serving a sentence for, or subject to supervision by the 
division of parole, whether on parole or on post-release supervision, for such offense 
or for a related offense;
(2)  A person charged with a sex offense who has been determined to be an incapacitated 
person with respect to that offense and has been committed pursuant to article 
seven hundred thirty of the criminal procedure law, but did engage in the conduct 
constituting such offense;
(3)   A person charged with a sex offense who has been found not responsible by reason 
of mental disease or defect for the commission of that offense;
(4)  A person who stands convicted of a designated felony that was sexually motivated 
and committed prior to the effective date of this article;
(5)  A person convicted of a sex offense who is, or was at any time after September first, 
two thousand five, a patient in a hospital operated by the office of mental health, 
and who was admitted directly to such facility pursuant to article nine of this title 
or section four hundred two of the correction law upon release or conditional release 
from a correctional facility, provided that the provisions of this article shall not be 
deemed to shorten or lengthen the time for which such person may be held pursuant 
to such article or section respectively; or
(6)   A person who has been determined to be a sex offender requiring civil management 
pursuant to this article.
 N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.03(g) (McKinney 2011). A “sex offense” is defined in section 
10.03(p):
“Sex offense” means an act or acts constituting: (1) any felony defined in article one 
hundred thirty of the penal law, including a sexually motivated felony; (2) patronizing 
a prostitute in the first degree as defined in section 230.06 of the penal law, incest in 
the second degree as defined in section 255.26 of the penal law, or incest in the first 
degree as defined in section 255.27 of the penal law; (3) a felony attempt or conspiracy 
to commit any of the foregoing offenses set forth in this subdivision; or (4) a designated 
felony, as defined in subdivision (f) of this section, if sexually motivated and committed 
prior to the effective date of this article.
 Id. § 10.03(p). 
33. Id. § 10.01. For an explanation of confinement and strict and intensive supervision, see infra notes 
36–43 and accompanying text.
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collateral, they are so important that their nondisclosure rendered the plea 
proceedings fundamentally unfair.”34 The Court of Appeals determined that the trial 
court’s failure to inform Harnett that he would be subject to the provisions of 
SOMTA and face potential civil confinement or strict and intensive supervision 
upon his conviction for the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree did not 
automatically invalidate his plea.35
 Specifically, SOMTA proceedings provide that multidisciplinary staff conduct a 
preliminary review of a detained sex offender prior to his release from prison in order 
to determine if the respondent should be referred to a case review team for further 
evaluation.36 The multidisciplinary staff can use the detained sex offender’s records, 
including his criminal history and details of the sex offense that constituted his sex 
offense.37 Upon referral, the case review team can also review the same records in 
order to determine if the detained sex offender requires civil management.38 Civil 
management includes being either placed in a “secure treatment facility” operated by 
the Office of Mental Health or put under strict and intensive supervision and 
treatment by the Division of Parole and the Office of Mental Health within the 
community.39 The New York attorney general may also elect to file a sex offender 
civil management petition in the respective court.40 If the case review team 
recommends civil management or the attorney general files a civil management 
petition, the supreme court or county court conducts a hearing without a jury to 
“determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is a sex 
offender requiring civil management.”41 If probable cause exists, the same court will 
“conduct a jury trial to determine whether the respondent is a detained sex offender 
34. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 248.
35. Id. at 203.
36. Mental Hyg. § 10.05(d).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 10.05(c) –(e).
39. See DOCS Fact Sheet: SOMTA/Civil Management, State of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs. (Dec. 2007), 
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/FactSheets/PDF/somta.pdf [hereinafter DOCS Fact Sheet]. A “secure 
treatment facility” is defined in section 10.03(o) as
a facility or a portion of a facility, designated by the commissioner, that may include a 
facility located on the grounds of a correctional facility, that is staffed with personnel 
from the office of mental health or the office . . . for people with developmental 
disabilities for the purposes of providing care and treatment to persons confined under 
this article, and persons defined in paragraph five of subdivision (g) of this section. 
Personnel from these same agencies may provide security services, provided that such 
staff are adequately trained in security methods and so equipped as to minimize the risk 
or danger of escape.
 Mental Hyg. § 10.03(o).
40. Id. § 10.06(a). This must include “[a] statement or statements alleging facts of an evidentiary character 
tending to support the allegation that the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management.” Id. 
41. Id. § 10.06(g), (k).
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who suffers from a ‘mental abnormality’” based on “clear and convincing evidence”42 
and, if so, the court will consider “whether the respondent is a dangerous sex offender 
requiring confinement or a sex offender requiring strict and intensive supervision.”43
 First, the Court of Appeals found Harnett’s argument that SOMTA proceedings 
are a direct consequence “without merit” because being subjected to SOMTA 
proceedings was a collateral, not a direct, consequence of Harnett’s guilty plea.44 
Second, the Court of Appeals determined that the case on which Harnett relied in 
asserting his fairness argument was distinguishable from his case because Harnett 
did not put forth facts on the record that indicated there was any “significant 
likelihood” that he would be subject to confinement under SOMTA proceedings.45
 In concluding that being subjected to SOMTA proceedings was a collateral 
consequence of his plea, the Court of Appeals first observed that courts are required 
to disclose direct consequences of guilty pleas to defendants, but are not obligated to 
disclose collateral consequences.46 The Court of Appeals defined direct consequences 
as “those that have a ‘definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on defendant’s 
punishment.’ Consequences that are ‘peculiar to the individual ’s personal 
circumstances and . . . not within the control of the court system’ have been held to 
be collateral.”47 The Court of Appeals looked to its decision in People v. Gravino for 
guidance on what constitutes a collateral consequence.48 In Gravino, the New York 
Court of Appeals held that the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) was 
collateral.49 Drawing analogies between SOMTA and SORA, the court in Harnett 
reasoned that both were civil statutes “designed to prevent a future crime,” not penal 
statutes designed to punish a past crime, and that both SOMTA and SORA involved 
42. Id. § 10.07(a). “The jury, or the court if a jury trial is waived [by respondent], shall determine by clear 
and convincing evidence whether the respondent . . . suffers from a mental abnormality. . . . A 
determination . . . must be by unanimous verdict.” Id. §10.07(d). The respondent is released if a 
unanimous verdict is not reached. If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, a second trial is 
scheduled and the same procedure is followed. Id. § 10.07(e).
43. Id. §10.07(f).
If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent has a mental 
abnormality involving such a strong predisposition to commit sex offenses, and such an 
inability to control behavior, that the respondent is likely to be a danger to others and to 
commit sex offenses . . . , the respondent shall be committed to a secure treatment 
facility for care, treatment, and control until such time as he or she no longer requires 
confinement.
 Id.
44. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 205–06 (2011).
45. Id. at 206–07.
46. Id. at 205.
47. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 403 (1995)).
48. Id. at 206.
49. Id.; People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546 (2010). SORA requires sex offenders, as defined as “any person 
who is convicted of ” certain sex offenses identified in the statute, to register as a sex offender. See N.Y. 
Correct. Law § 168-a (McKinney 2011).
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“decisions and recommendations . . . made, after the time of a guilty plea, by 
administrative agencies not under the court’s control.”50 The Court of Appeals also 
reasoned that SOMTA was not an “automatic” consequence of a defendant’s guilty 
plea because the majority of sex offenders ultimately are not found to be subjected to 
SOMTA’s consequences of civil confinement and intensive supervision.51 To support 
this contention, the Court of Appeals considered statistics from a 2010 report that 
found that approximately “six percent of those detained sex offenders . . . were or 
were likely to be subjected to civil confinement” under SOMTA.52 Therefore, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that the consequences of SOMTA are collateral and not 
direct.53
 Second, the Court of Appeals considered whether “fundamental fairness” 
nevertheless warranted a reversal.54 The court analogized Harnett’s situation to that 
of the defendant in State v. Bellamy, in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
“that fundamental fairness requires that prior to accepting a plea to a predicate 
offense, the trial court must inform a defendant of the possible consequences under 
the [Sexually Violent Predator] Act.”55 In Bellamy, the defendant had served a 
significant portion of his sentence for a sex crime at the time of his guilty plea, with 
only a short time remaining before his release.56 A week before he was released, 
however, he discovered that he was going to be civilly committed under New Jersey’s 
Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), a statute similar to SOMTA.57 The Bellamy 
court found that the SVPA was collateral because the legislative intent was regulatory, 
not punitive, and the consequences of the statute did not “automatically f low from 
the conviction.”58 Despite this finding, the Bellamy court concluded that
fundamental fairness requires that the trial court inform a defendant of the 
possible consequences under the Act. A defendant who has committed a 
predicate offense may be faced with commitment under the Act for a period 
in excess of his or her sentence. [New Jersey rules] require[] the court to 
determine whether a defendant clearly understands “the nature of the charge 
and the consequences of the plea.”59
50. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206 (citation omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 205 (citing N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A Report on the 2007 Law That 
Established Civil Management for Sex Offenders in New York State (2010), http://www.
ag.ny.gov/bureaus/sexual_offender/pdfs/April2010YearlyReport.pdf).
53. Id. at 206.
54. Id. at 206–08.
55. Id.; State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231 (N.J. 2003).
56. Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1234.
57. Id. at 1233–35; see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.24 (West 2011).
58. Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1237–38.
59. Id. at 1238.
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 In Harnett, the Court of Appeals distinguished Bellamy from Harnett’s case, 
observing that, unlike the defendant in Bellamy, Harnett has not been “made the 
subject of a SOMTA proceeding,” and that he did not put forth facts on the record 
that indicated that there was any “significant likelihood that that would occur.”60 
The Court of Appeals noted that notions of fairness provide that some pleas may be 
entered into “involuntarily” because, whether collateral or not, the consequences of 
the plea may be “of such great importance to [the defendant] that he would have 
made a different decision had that consequence been disclosed.”61
 Based on this reasoning, the Court of Appeals concluded that SOMTA is a 
collateral consequence to Harnett’s plea, and the facts did not suggest that 
fundamental fairness was at risk here.62 The Court of Appeals, therefore, affirmed 
the Third Department’s decision holding that Harnett’s plea agreement was valid.63
 The dissent, however, disagreed with the majority on several grounds.64 First, the 
dissent found that the consequences of SOMTA, which could result in confinement 
longer than a defendant’s prison term, may constitute “potentially greater 
deprivation[s] of liberty than the criminal sentence imposed,” making it more like a 
direct consequence.65 Second, the dissent argued that trial courts have “a constitutional 
obligation to ensure that a defendant has a ‘full understanding of what the plea 
connotes and its consequences. [D]ue process requires that the record must be clear 
that the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative 
courses of action open to the defendant.’”66 The dissent also contended that, while 
SOMTA may be a collateral consequence, a defendant cannot “knowingly and 
voluntarily” waive his “right to a trial if he does not know the full extent of 
confinement that might result from his conviction.”67 Third, the dissent disagreed 
with the majority’s logic that disclosure is not required simply because SOMTA 
proceedings take place under a separate administrative process.68 As the dissent 
explained, this logic does not hold because it is the “initial conviction that determines 
a defendant’s eligibility for that evaluative process”—that is, it is a defendant’s initial 
conviction that triggers SOMTA proceedings.69 Fourth, the dissent also took issue 
with the majority’s analysis of the probability that SOMTA’s civil confinement 
provisions would be applied to Harnett.70 The dissent emphasized that “any chance 
60. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 207 (2011).
61. Id. (quoting People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546, 559 (2010)).
62. Id. at 206–08.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 208–10 (Ciparick, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 209 (citing People v. Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d 614 (3d Dep’t 2010)).
66. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 402–03 (1995)).
67. Id. 
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 209–10.
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that a defendant will face further confinement as a result of his plea should be made 
known to him at the time the plea is taken.”71 Therefore, consistent with Bellamy, the 
dissent found that notions of “fundamental fairness require[] the defendant’s 
knowledge of that consequence,” even though being subjected to SOMTA proceedings 
is collateral.72
III.  HARNETT COURT’S HOLDING CONTRAVENES CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS 
REQUIREMENTS
 The Court of Appeals’s holding that SOMTA proceedings are a collateral 
consequence of entering a plea agreement to sexual offenses and, therefore, are not 
required to be disclosed to criminal defendants, contravenes the constitutional 
requirement under the Fifth Amendment that a defendant enter a plea knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.73 This case comment makes three contentions. First, 
the court incorrectly concluded that SOMTA was a collateral, not a direct, 
consequence of entering a guilty plea to a sex offense because the court failed to 
consider the language and intent of SOMTA, which provides that criminal and civil 
proceedings for sex offenders are to follow an “integrated approach.”74 In so holding, 
the court failed to sufficiently account for the close relationship between the criminal 
and civil proceedings and underestimated the significance of statistical data regarding 
the possibility of civil confinement or strict and intensive supervision for defendants 
convicted of sex offenses. Further, the court relied upon Gravino to substantiate its 
claim that being subject to the provisions of SOMTA is a collateral consequence that 
can be readily distinguished from the case in Harnett.
 Second, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla challenges the Harnett 
court’s use of a categorical methodology for determining disclosures to criminal 
defendants, raising important constitutional concerns regarding information that 
must be made available to defendants to ensure that plea bargains are entered into 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Specifically, civil confinement and strict 
and intensive supervision, like deportation in Padilla, are significant because they 
deprive a defendant of his liberty. The Harnett court also did not properly apply 
notions of fundamental fairness, as articulated in Bellamy, in deciding whether the 
consequences under SOMTA of a guilty plea must be disclosed to Harnett.
IV. THE HARNETT COURT’S CONSEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS: DIRECT OR COLLATERAL?
 In Harnett, the Court of Appeals concluded that SOMTA is a collateral 
consequence because it is civil and not penal, it is administered by an agency separate 
71. Id. at 209 n.1 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 209–10 .
73. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243–44 (1969).
74. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.01(a) (McKinney 2011).
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from the courts, and its application to Harnett was “far from automatic.”75 The Court 
of Appeals failed to properly consider the language and purpose of SOMTA.
 A. Legislative Intent: The State’s “Integrated Approach”
 It is well settled that New York courts find that “the statutory text . . . is the 
clearest indicator of legislative purpose.”76 Contrary to the Court of Appeals’s 
findings, the language of SOMTA makes clear that the legislature did not intend for 
the criminal and civil process to be separate and distinct as applied to sex offenders.77 
SOMTA section 10.01(a) states that
recidivistic sex offenders pose a danger to society that should be addressed 
through comprehensive programs of treatment and management. Civil and 
criminal processes have distinct but overlapping goals, and both should be part 
of an integrated approach that is based on evolving scientific understanding, 
f lexible enough to respond to current needs of individual offenders, and 
sufficient to provide meaningful treatment and to protect the public.78
The goal of SOMTA is clear—to protect society from sex offenders who might 
commit offenses again.79 The method by which SOMTA reaches this goal is an 
“integrated approach” between the civil and criminal proceedings.80
 The ordinary meaning of the term “integrated” sheds light on how a court should 
interpret the term “integrated approach.” Integrated means: “Combined into a whole; 
united; undivided. Also of a personality in which the component elements combine 
harmoniously. . . . Or [u]niting in one system several constituents previously regarded 
as separate.”81 With respect to this “integrated approach,” SOMTA section 10.01(e) 
further states that, “[i]deally, effective risk assessment should begin to occur prior to 
sentencing in the criminal process, and it should guide the process of civil 
commitment.”82 By failing to analyze the language of the statute, the plain meaning 
of “integrated,” and its use within section 10.01(e) of SOMTA, the Court of Appeals 
ignored the legislature’s intent that criminal and civil proceedings involving SOMTA 
should be united “in one system.”83
75. See Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206.
76. In re M.B., 6 N.Y.3d 437, 447 (2006).
77. Mental Hyg. § 10.01(a)–(b).
78. Id. § 10.01(a) (emphasis added).
79. S. 3318 (N.Y. 2007), 2007 Legis. Bill Hist. N.Y. S.B. 3318 (LEXIS) (sponsor’s memorandum in 
support).
80. Mental Hyg. § 10.01(a).
81. Oxford English Dictionary 1065 (2d ed. 1989).
82. Mental Hyg. § 10.01(e) (emphasis added).
83. See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text.
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 B. Gravino Is Distinguishable from Harnett
 In taking a categorical approach to SOMTA, the Court of Appeals also incorrectly 
relied on its prior holding in Gravino.84 The Gravino court concluded that a 
defendant’s guilty plea was valid despite the fact that she was not informed of SORA 
prior to entering her plea because SORA was a collateral consequence.85 Gravino 
contended that “her guilty plea was involuntary because the judge did not tell her 
that she would have to register as a sex offender” until after she entered her guilty 
plea and was sentenced.86 She contended that SORA was a direct consequence of her 
guilty plea due to the significance of “the ramifications of being identified as a sex 
offender.”87 The court found that SORA was civil in nature and not part of the penal 
phase of sentencing.88 Similarly, the Harnett court reasoned that SOMTA is a civil, 
not penal, statute “designed to prevent future crime,” and that SOMTA relies on 
administrative agencies outside a court’s control.89 SORA and SOMTA, however, 
are readily distinguishable from each other in two ways, thereby further challenging 
the Court of Appeals’s reasoning.
 First, the language of SOMTA clearly provides that the civil and criminal 
proceedings are to follow an integrated approach.90 The language that the legislature 
chose for SORA, however, does not include or reference any type of relationship 
between the civil and penal phase of a defendant’s proceedings.91 Second, in contrast 
to SORA, SOMTA involves the potential for a defendant’s liberty to be taken away 
from him indefinitely.92 While a released sex offender is required to register with 
state authorities pursuant to SORA’s requirements93 and, as a result, may suffer 
difficulties matriculating into society because of the public stigma associated with 
such registration, his liberty has not been taken away from him.94 The Court of 
Appeals’s failure to acknowledge these critical differences between the two statutes 
84. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 205–06 (2011).
85. People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546, 554–59 (2010).
86. Id. at 551.
87. Id. at 555–56.
88. Id. at 556.
89. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206.
90. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.01(a) (McKinney 2011).
91. Compare N.Y. Correct. Law § 168 (McKinney 2011) (SORA does not use the term “integrate”), with 
Mental Hyg. § 10.01(a) (“Civil and criminal processes have distinct but overlapping goals, and both 
should be part of an integrated approach that is based on evolving scientific understanding, f lexible 
enough to respond to current needs of individual offenders, and sufficient to provide meaningful 
treatment and to protect the public.” (emphasis added)).
92. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 208–09 (Ciparick, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 203–06 (majority opinion).
94. See generally People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546 (2010).
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further calls into question the court’s reliance on Gravino in holding that confinement 
under SOMTA is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea to a sex offense.95
 C. Treatment and the Criminal-Civil Relationship 
 SOMTA provides that the criminal justice system should offer sex offenders 
appropriate treatment while incarcerated.96 By ignoring the language and legislative 
intent of SOMTA, the court overlooked the relationship between the sex offender 
treatment administered while the defendant is incarcerated within the criminal 
system and the outcome of the civil proceedings under SOMTA. Such a relationship 
further supports the contention that consequences of the civil proceedings under 
SOMTA are not separate and independent from the criminal proceedings.97 
According to the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) Sex 
Offender Counseling and Treatment Guidelines,
[t]he Department supports and conducts sex offender counseling and 
treatment programs under the premise that sex offenders can change and that 
sexual re-offending behavior can be reduced through counseling and 
treatment. If an inmate is referred for review under Mental Hygiene Law, 
Article 10, successful completion of the [Sex Offender Counseling and 
Treatment Program] will be considered during the evaluations which take 
place as part of that process and may be viewed as a factor in the inmate’s favor 
regarding the need for civil management.98
 The objectives of sex offender treatment are to reduce the likelihood of recidivism 
and protect the public.99 Although New York State admits that there are mixed 
results regarding the effectiveness of treatment, it notes important lessons, including 
that “treatment can be successful if it is geared toward the type of abuse and reasons 
behind it.”100 Furthermore, “SOMTA significantly enhanced the caliber of the 
treatment programs DOCS must provide to all sex offenders . . . . The expanded 
programs must aim to reduce the likelihood of reoffending by helping those inmates 
to control the chain of their own behavior that leads to sexual offending.”101
 Pursuant to SOMTA, the treatment a sex offender receives while incarcerated is 
included in the relevant records used by the multidisciplinary staff in determining 
95. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206.
96. Mental Hyg. § 10.01(f).
97. See id.
98. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., Sex Offender Counseling and Treatment Program 
Guidelines 1, 5 (2008) [hereinafter Guidelines] (emphasis added), http://www.docs.state.ny.us/
ProgramServices/SOCTP_Guidelines_Nov08.pdf.
99. Mental Hyg. § 10.01(a)–(f).
100. “Myths and Facts” Current Research on Managing Sex Offenders April 2008, N.Y. State Division of Crim. 
Just. Services, http://criminaljustice.ny.gov/nsor/som_mythsandfacts.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
101. DOCS Fact Sheet, supra note 39, at 1–2.
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whether a sex offender should be recommended to the case review team.102 The case 
review team is also permitted to use this information in determining whether civil 
management should be recommended.103
 The fact that the treatment a sex offender receives during the criminal phase is 
used by the multidisciplinary staff in determining whether the respondent should be 
referred to a case review team, as well as used by the case review team to determine 
whether the respondent requires civil management, illustrates the integrated 
relationship between civil and criminal proceedings. A defendant’s progress, or lack 
thereof, during treatment while criminally incarcerated, therefore, inf luences 
recommendations for civil management after incarceration.104 Though the treatment 
a defendant receives during the penal phase may not be under the control of the 
court, the Court of Appeals failed to account for the interrelationship between the 
criminal proceedings and civil proceedings due to this treatment. Furthermore, this 
interrelationship is consistent with the legislative intent of SOMTA to provide an 
“integrated approach” to the “[c]ivil and criminal processes.”105 Accordingly, the 
criminal proceedings have a direct impact on the civil proceedings under SOMTA.106
 Also, although confinement or intensive and strict supervision that ultimately 
may be required under SOMTA proceedings are peculiar to the individual, SOMTA’s 
text makes clear that all detained sex offenders are automatically subject to the 
provisions of SOMTA and, thus, the possibility of indefinite civil confinement.107 In 
addition to receiving treatment during incarceration, these provisions require that 
DOCS notify the New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) of the 
respondent’s pending discharge from prison.108 DOCS then discloses all of the 
respondent’s relevant records to the multidisciplinary staff and case review team, 
including sex treatment he received while incarcerated.109 The OMH interviews the 
respondent to determine the offender’s dangerousness, with civil confinement and 
102. Mental Hyg. § 10.05(d) (“[S]uch staff shall review and assess relevant medical, clinical, criminal, or 
institutional records, actuarial risk assessment instruments or other records and reports, including 
records and reports provided by the district attorney of the county where the person was convicted.”).
103. Id. § 10.05(e) (“Upon such referral, the case review team shall review relevant records, including those 
described in subdivisions (c) and (d) of this section.”).
104. Id. § 10.05(d) (“[S]uch staff shall review and assess relevant medical, clinical, criminal, or institutional 
records, actuarial risk assessment instruments or other records and reports, including records and 
reports provided by the district attorney of the county where the person was convicted.”); id. § 10.05(e) 
(“Upon such referral, the case review team shall review relevant records, including those described in 
subdivisions (c) and (d) of this section.”).
105. Id. § 10.01(a).
106. See id. § 10.01(a)–(g); Guidelines, supra note 98, at 5.
107. Mental Hyg. § 10.05(b) (“When it appears to an agency with jurisdiction that a person who may be a 
detained sex offender is nearing an anticipated release from confinement, the agency shall give notice of 
that fact to the attorney general and to the commissioner of mental health.”); DOCS Fact Sheet, supra 
note 39.
108. See DOCS Fact Sheet, supra note 39.
109. See id.
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strict and intensive supervision as possible consequences of the OMH’s evaluation 
process.110 Given the litany of treatments, disclosures, and procedures sex offenders 
submit to when they have been convicted of, or have entered a guilty plea for, a sex 
offense, it is difficult to see how the Court of Appeals could find that the majority of 
detained sex offenders “will suffer no consequences from that designation at all.”111 
Further, consistent with the dissent’s position, it is the “initial conviction that 
determines a defendant’s eligibility” for SOMTA.112 Therefore, the interrelationship 
between the criminal and civil proceedings demonstrates the f law in the Court of 
Appeals’ oversimplification; that is, because SOMTA proceedings are directed under 
a separate administrative process, they are collateral.113
 D. Civil Confinement Statistics
 In addition to failing to consider the interrelationship between the criminal and 
civil proceedings, the Court of Appeals, in concluding that “the consequences of a 
defendant’s plea are far from automatic,” underestimated the significance of data 
collected monthly by the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS).114 Specifically, 
the DCJS tracks the number of detained sex offenders referred to case review teams 
and recommended for civil management, shedding important light on what 
ramifications are truly at stake for detained sex offenders.115 The data the Court of 
Appeals referred to was collected by the Office of Sex Offender Management in the 
DCJS and supports the view that SOMTA is a direct consequence of a sex offense 
conviction.116 According to the DCJS, since April 2007, 13.2% of detained sex 
offenders reviewed by the multidisciplinary staff at the OMH were referred to a case 
review team.117 Of the detained sex offenders recommended to a case review team, 
almost 45% were subsequently recommended for civil management, or 5.7% of the 
total number who were referred to OMH for review.118 In other words, a defendant 
convicted of a sex offense that subjects him to SOMTA has a 5.7% chance of being 
110. See id.
111. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 206 (2011).
112. Id. at 209 (Cipatrick, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 205–06 (majority opinion).
114. Id. at 206; State of N.Y., Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., Evaluation and Processing of Cases, 
Mar. 13, 2007 Through Dec. 31, 2011 (2011) [hereinafter Evaluation and Processing of Cases] 
(on file with author).
115. Evaluation and Processing of Cases, supra note 114
116. Id. 
117. Id.; N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.05(d) (McKinney 2011) (In addition to reviewing relevant records, 
including medical, clinical, criminal, and institutional, the case review team can order a psychiatric 
examination of the inmate to use in its determination of whether a detainee should be recommended for 
civil management); see also id. § 10.05(e) (“Upon such referral, the case review team shall review relevant 
records, including those described in subdivisions (c) and (d) of this section, and may arrange for a 
psychiatric examination of the respondent.”).
118. Evaluation and Processing of Cases, supra note 114.
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recommended for civil management, which includes either civil confinement or strict 
or intensive supervision, upon release from incarceration.119
 In concluding that “experience to date indicates that the large majority of people 
who are ‘detained sex offenders’ as SOMTA defines the term will suffer no 
consequences from that designation at all,” the Court of Appeals ignored the fact 
that almost 6 out of every 100 convicted sex offenders in New York could be 
perpetually confined or subjected to intensive and strict supervision for life after 
serving an incarcerated sentence as a result of SOMTA’s civil management 
provisions.120 When a defendant enters a guilty plea, he is making a bargain: he is 
waiving “a number of valuable constitutional rights in order to obtain reasonable 
assurance of certainty rather than gamble the possibility of a not guilty verdict 
against the heavier punishment, the greater anxiety and, in some cases at least, the 
greater expense, involved in a full trial.”121 The greater this “assurance of certainty is 
diluted,” the greater “the bargaining process becomes less acceptable to defendants.”122 
A 5.7% likelihood, therefore, would certainly weigh heavily in a defendant’s calculus 
of choosing the certainty afforded by a plea bargain or taking the chance at trial.123 
When a defendant enters a plea bargain not knowing that there is a 5.7% likelihood 
119. Id.; see also DOCS Fact Sheet, supra note 39.
For those offenders determined by the case review team to have a mental abnormality 
that predisposes them to commit new sex offenses, the Attorney General’s Office files 
petitions that seek civil management through a process of establishing probable cause 
and taking the case to a jury. If a jury concurs with the belief that the sex offender may 
pose a threat to society, the judge can then decide whether to confine the offender at an 
OMH-operated secure facility or place the offender under [strict and intensive 
supervision and treatment] in the community.
 Id.
120. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 206 (2011). “By pleading guilty, defendant exposed himself to the 
possibility that he would be confined after expiration of his prison sentence, perhaps indefinitely.” Id. at 
210 (Cipatrick, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also State v. Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d 644, 647 (Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. County 2011) (“ ‘Involuntary civil conf inement  [pursuant to Article 10] may 
entail  indefinite  confinement, [which] could be a more intrusive exercise of state power than 
incarceration following a criminal conviction’” (alterations in original) (quoting Mental Hygiene Legal 
Serv. v. Spitzer, No. 07 Civ. 2935 (GEL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85163, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 
2007), aff ’d sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Paterson, No. 07-5548-cv, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 
4942 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2009))); People v. Nieves, 896 N.Y.S.2d 644, 649 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2010) 
(“Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law, enacted by the Legislature in 2007, authorizes certain 
convicted sex offenders to be subject to  indefinite civil confinement  in a secure mental health facility 
or indefinite strict and intensive supervision and treatment in the community upon a finding by a jury 
that such an offender suffers from a ‘Mental Abnormality’ as defined by the statute.”).
121. People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d 340, 346 (1980).
122. Id.
123. It is also important to note that the DCJS does not track these statistics by the specific sex offense. See 
Evaluation and Processing of Cases, supra note 114. Such data might be very relevant for a 
respondent to determine whether there is an increased probability of civil confinement or strict and 
intensive supervision based on the specific sex offense to which they are admitting guilt. This data 
would also be suggestive of a consequential relationship solely associated with a particular sex offense 
and the potential for civil confinement.
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that he will be recommended for civil management, the benefits of the bargain 
between the defendant and the criminal justice system have been significantly 
compromised to the detriment of both parties.
V.  LIMITATIONS ON THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH: PADILLA V. KENTUCKY AND 
STATE V. BELLAMY
 A. Padilla v. Kentucky
 Aside from whether SOMTA is a direct consequence of pleading guilty to a sex 
offense and therefore mandates disclosure, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 holding in 
Padilla v. Kentucky raises concerns about the New York Court of Appeals’s categorical 
approach in Harnett as well as highlights the constitutional and policy arguments in 
favor of mandating disclosure of SOMTA.124 The defendant in Padilla claimed that 
his counsel did not inform him, before he entered a guilty plea, that deportation was 
a consequence of his conviction and that, had he been so informed, he would have 
chosen to go to trial.125 In a prior proceeding, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled 
against the defendant, holding that “the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective 
assistance of counsel does not protect a criminal defendant from erroneous advice 
about deportation because it is merely a ‘collateral’ consequence of his conviction.”126 
Reversing the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that, 
124. It is important to note that in concluding that SOMTA was a collateral consequence, the court relied on 
People v. Ford, a New York case that concluded that defendants who may be deported after serving their 
sentences do not have a right to disclosure of deportation consequences. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 205 
(citing to People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397 (1995)). The court’s reliance is misplaced given the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s more recent holding in Padilla, which effectively overruled Ford. See Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). In Padilla, the Supreme Court concluded that the consequences 
of deportation for a defendant are so severe that attorneys must disclose deportation to their clients prior 
to them entering a guilty plea. Id. The New York Court of Appeals’ dependence in Harnett on Ford calls 
into question the foundation of the majority’s holding that SOMTA is collateral. Notably, the New York 
Court of Appeals also referenced Padilla in the context that a defendant could argue a plea was made 
involuntarily if he was not informed about SOMTA, the likelihood of being confined under SOMTA 
was realistic, and such knowledge would have changed his decision to enter a guilty plea.
But since SOMTA consequences can include extended confinement, a plea made in 
ignorance of such consequences may sometimes be proved involuntary—if a defendant 
can show that the prospect of SOMTA confinement was realistic enough that it 
reasonably could have caused him, and in fact would have caused him, to reject an 
otherwise acceptable plea bargain. Of course, in such cases the defendant will have to 
prove that he did not know about SOMTA—i.e., that his lawyer did not tell him about 
it—before he pleaded guilty. Thus, the issue of whether the plea was voluntary may be 
closely linked to the question of whether a defendant received the effective assistance of 
counsel.
 Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 207 (citing Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1473). However, the court found that this was 
not the case with this defendant. “On this record, we do not know either whether his lawyer told him 
about SOMTA or whether, considering the facts of defendant’s situation, SOMTA would have been a 
significant factor in the evaluation of a plea bargain.” Id. at 207–08.
125. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
126. Id.
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although deportation is an entirely civil process, it is “intimately related to the criminal 
process” and carries consequences that are “particularly severe.”127 In Padilla, the 
Court held that the “longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of 
deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of 
deportation on families . . . demand no less” than disclosing that entering a guilty plea 
“carries the risk of deportation.”128 It held that this classification is thus “ill-suited” 
because the nature of this intimate relationship makes deportation “uniquely difficult 
to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence.”129
 The Court also observed that the immigration statute at hand was “succinct, clear, 
and explicit in defining the removal consequence” for the defendant.130 In this context, 
the Court held that even when the specific deportation consequences for a particular 
defendant are not clear, attorneys must at least advise their clients “that pending 
criminal charges may carry adverse immigration consequences.”131 This holding is 
consistent with the policy consideration underlying plea bargains: establishing 
disclosures and creating a “full record” gives the defendant certainty in the plea 
bargaining process as well as supports the integrity of the criminal justice proceedings.132
 The Court’s reasoning in Padilla suggests two important limitations on applying 
Harnett ’s direct-versus-collateral categorical approach.133 First, a categorical approach 
127. Id. at 1481.
128. Id. at 1486.
129. Id. at 1481–82.
130. Id. at 1483 (“In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and 
explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla’s conviction.”).
131. Id. at 1483, 1485.
132. People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d 340, 346 (1980) (“[T]he importance of a full record so that defendant 
will understand that he can rely on what is stated on the record, within the limitations stated, and 
cannot under any but the most unusual circumstances rely on anything not stated on the record no 
matter what discussion there has been.”).
133. Padilla also established an important constitutional position regarding the Sixth Amendment on which 
Harnett brief ly acknowledged, but did not elaborate. See People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200 (2011). The 
Supreme Court asserted that the classification of direct or collateral consequences is “ill-suited” with 
respect to the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Padilla, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1476. This assertion creates an important paradox against the backdrop of the Harnett decision. 
In determining that deportation must be disclosed to defendants by their attorney pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment as measured under the first-prong of the Strickland test, the Supreme Court implicitly 
established that such disclosures must also be made under the Fifth Amendment’s requirements of due 
process. Id. at 1477. The first prong of the Strickland test is measured by whether or not the defendant 
received “reasonable professional assistance” from his or her attorney. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 688, 694–95 (1984) (this is a highly deferential standard by which courts are to apply a wide 
latitude to attorneys). Applying this highly deferential standard in Padilla, the Supreme Court 
determined that attorneys must make disclosures regarding deportation to their clients prior to the 
entry of a guilty plea. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. Under such a rationale, it is plausible that the 
Supreme Court effectively imputed such disclosures to the Fifth Amendment’s requirements of 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering a guilty plea. See N.Y. Crim. Prac. § 12.07(5) (2d ed. 
2010). In noting Padilla’s holding regarding the Sixth Amendment, Harnett opened the door to 
imputing constitutional due process requirements for SOMTA disclosures.
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may be inappropriate where the civil processes and consequences are intimately 
related to the criminal. Consistent with Padilla’s observation of the relationship 
between a criminal conviction and deportation proceedings, the criminal and civil 
proceedings to which Harnett is subject under SOMTA are “intimately related.” The 
classification of a civil management consequence as either direct or collateral is 
therefore “ill-suited.” But, as noted by the dissent in Harnett, all detained sex 
offenders are subject to SOMTA, with a 5.7% likelihood of being subjected to 
indefinite civil confinement or intensive and strict supervision.134 SOMTA also 
states specifically that the criminal and civil proceedings are integrated processes 
and that the treatment a defendant receives during the penal phase can influence the 
outcome of the civil proceedings.135 Like deportation, SOMTA is therefore “‘most 
difficult’ to divorce the penalty from the conviction.”136 In this respect, Harnett ’s 
finding that the criminal and civil proceedings are “not under the court’s control” is 
inapposite under Padilla.137
 Second, Padilla challenges using a categorical approach when the language of the 
statute spells out very clear consequences.138 The Court in Padilla emphasized that 
the deportation statute in question was “succinct, clear, and explicit” with respect to 
“the removal consequences for Padilla’s conviction.”139 Similarly, SOMTA’s language 
is “succinct, clear, and explicit” with respect to the process by which a sex offender is 
subject under SOMTA.140 SOMTA clearly states that sex offenders are generally 
subject to SOMTA and also defines and outlines the procedures, circumstances, and 
standards under which a convicted defendant is subject to civil confinement or strict 
and intensive supervision.141 Therefore, in applying a categorical approach to 
determine that SOMTA need not be disclosed to defendants, Harnett ignored the 
critical limitations in using such an approach emphasized by Padilla.142
134. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 208 (Ciparick, J., dissenting) (Though the dissent found that SOMTA was a 
collateral consequence, it stated: “I dissented in  Gravino  on the ground that because imposition of 
SORA registration is mandatory and known at the time of the plea, it ought to be considered a direct 
consequence of that plea. This rationale likewise applies to defendant’s automatic eligibility for SOMTA 
review. All defendants convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree and sentenced to a prison term are  
‘detained sex offenders’ under SOMTA. The statute requires that the Attorney General and 
Commissioner of Mental Health receive notice of a detained sex offender’s scheduled release date and 
provides the authority to take further action towards civil management, if warranted.” (citations 
omitted)); See also N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§ 10.01, 10.03(g) (McKinney 2011).
135. Mental Hyg. § 10.01(a).
136. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (citation omitted).
137. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206.
138. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See generally N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§ 10.01, 10.05–10.07 (McKinney 2011).
142. Relying on Padilla, Harnett stated that had the defendant put forth on the record that he was not 
informed of SOMTA, there was a realistic likelihood he would have been confined under SOMTA, 
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 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of the significant consequences 
of deportation not only further supports the limitations of using a categorical 
approach for disclosure, but also raises important issues regarding an individual’s 
constitutionally protected liberty at stake.143 Like deportation, the potential 
consequences of SOMTA, including indefinite strict supervision or civil confinement, 
can be equally as devastating as deportation because an individual’s liberty is being 
taken away without due process.144
 Finally, in Harrett the Court of Appeals’s reliance on Padilla in finding that a 
defendant who can put forth on the record that he did not know about SOMTA, 
that there was a “realistic” chance that he would be subject to confinement, and that 
such knowledge would have caused him to not enter a plea bargain is misplaced.145 
The court stated,
But since SOMTA consequences can include extended confinement, a plea 
made in ignorance of such consequences may sometimes be proved 
involuntary—if a defendant can show that the prospect of SOMTA 
confinement was realistic enough that it reasonably could have caused him, 
and in fact would have caused him, to reject an otherwise acceptable plea 
bargain. Of course, in such cases the defendant will have to prove that he did 
not know about SOMTA—i.e., that his lawyer did not tell him about it—
before he pleaded guilty. Thus, the issue of whether the plea was voluntary 
may be closely linked to the question of whether a defendant received the 
effective assistance of counsel.146
This rationale not only overlooks Padilla’s observations about why the categorical 
approach is “ill-suited” in certain situations, but also puts convicted sex offenders 
subject to SOMTA in a paradoxical position: after defendants have served their time, 
they would need to establish that SOMTA was not disclosed to them, that 
“confinement was realistic enough” under SOMTA at the time of their conviction, 
and that they would have rejected the plea bargain.147 This logic is f lawed for several 
reasons. First, it creates inefficiencies within the judicial process because defendants 
would need to contend that their due process rights were violated after they have 
served their time. Second, the Court of Appeals does not define or elaborate on what 
“realistic enough” means, putting defendants, their attorneys, and the courts in the 
highly subjective position of having to make this determination on a case-by-case 
and this would have caused him to reject his guilty plea, he could have contended his right to due 
process was violated. See Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 207 (citing Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1473).
143. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
144. See In re Civil Commitment of D.L., 797 A.2d 166, 173 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“Confinement 
. . . is theoretically without end. In that sense, it constitutes a greater liberty deprivation than that 
imposed upon a criminal defendant who, in all but a handful of cases, is given a maximum release date. 
A more onerous impairment of a person’s liberty interest is difficult to imagine.”).
145. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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basis. Third, the court limits the scope of SOMTA consequences to confinement 
when, in fact, a defendant may consider strict and intensive supervision a severe 
enough consequence that it might change his decision to enter a plea bargain. Finally, 
as noted, SOMTA provides sex offenders treatment during the penal phase that can 
inf luence the outcome of the proceedings under SOMTA.148 Thus, what may be 
“realistic enough” when a defendant enters his guilty plea, may change in or against 
his favor as he participates in sex treatment programs during the penal phase. 
Therefore, with respect to this argument, Harnett ’s logic is f lawed.
 B. State v. Bellamy
 Regardless of whether SOMTA is a direct or a collateral consequence of a guilty 
plea, Harnett also did not fully account for a further limitation on its holding: notions 
of fundamental fairness, which implicate the integrity of the plea bargain process 
and support the disclosure of civil consequences under SOMTA to criminal 
defendants.149 Although Harnett presents a case of first impression for the New York 
courts, State v. Bellamy comports with Padilla’s non-categorical approach in analyzing 
the consequences of entering a plea agreement and therefore provides persuasive 
authority.150
 In Bellamy, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered fundamental fairness 
and the integrity of the plea bargain process in concluding that the potential 
consequences for a convicted sex offender under the New Jersey Sexually Violent 
Predator Act must be disclosed to defendants prior to their entry of a guilty plea.151 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that
when the consequences of a plea may be so severe that a defendant may be 
confined for the remainder of his or her life, fundamental fairness demands 
that the trial court inform defendant of that possible consequence. The failure 
of either the court or defense counsel to inform defendant that a possible 
consequence of a plea to a predicate offense under the Act is future 
confinement for an indefinite period deprives that defendant of information 
needed to make a knowing and voluntary plea.152
148. DOCS Fact Sheet, supra note 39.
149. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 207–08.
150. Compare State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231 (N.J. 2003) (“[I]t matters little if the consequences are called 
indirect or collateral when in fact their impact is devastating.” (alteration in original) (quoting  New 
Jersey v. Heitzman, 527 A.2d 439, 441 (N.J. 1987) (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting)), with Padilla v. Kentucky, 
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (“Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its 
close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral 
consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited . . . .”). Also, the Bellamy court 
went even further than mandating disclosure of the statute; it also determined that the decision would 
be applied with limited retroactivity. Under a limited retroactive application, the new rule would apply 
to any cases under direct review at the time the rule was announced. See Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1238–39.
151. Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1234, 1238–39.
152. Id. at 1238–39.
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 Given the potential indefinite loss of liberty, Harnett underestimated the notions 
of fairness that should be factored into the plea bargain process. Though Harnett 
admittedly acknowledged that certain circumstances may exist where a collateral 
consequence of a plea may be of such significance that it could offend due process if 
not disclosed, it fell short of mandating the disclosure of SOMTA.
[The New York Court of Appeals] said in Gravino that “[t]here may be cases in 
which a defendant can show that he pleaded guilty in ignorance of a consequence 
that, although collateral for purposes of due process, was of such great 
importance to him that he would have made a different decision had that 
consequence been disclosed.” We observed that such cases would be “rare,” 
because “in the vast majority of plea bargains the overwhelming consideration 
for the defendant is whether he will be imprisoned and for how long.”153
Rather, Harnett appeared to shift the burden onto the defendant to show the 
likelihood that SOMTA would apply. The Court of Appeals noted that “[i]t is not 
asserted that this defendant has been made the subject of a SOMTA proceeding, and 
we cannot tell on this record whether there is or ever was any significant likelihood 
that that would occur.”154 This establishes an impossible feat for any sex offender 
defendant who is disputing a plea agreement based on lack of disclosure of SOMTA. 
The defendant would not know his own “likelihood” of being subjected to the 
potentially severe consequences of SOMTA until after they have served their sentence 
and the case review team makes its determination that the defendant requires strict 
supervision or civil confinement.155 Given that Harnett only recently entered his plea 
and has not yet fulfilled his prison sentence, and the case review team’s determination 
has not been made with respect to him, the court holds him to an impossible task.156 
By creating an insurmountable burden, Harnett misses the significance and essence 
of the Bellamy holding—that is, when constitutional liberty is at stake, “fundamental 
fairness demands that the trial court” make such disclosures to a defendant.157
153. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546 
(2010).
154. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 207.
155. As previously noted, New York State does not track statistics on the type of sex offense relative to strict 
supervision or civil confinement for sex offenders; therefore, it would be impossible for a defendant to 
know whether or not he faces a greater likelihood of being subject to SOMTA when he enters his plea. 
See supra note 123; see also N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.01(a) (McKinney 2011).
156. See supra note 155.
157. Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1238; see also People v. Parker, 711 N.Y.S.2d 656, 661 (4th Dep’t 2000) 
(“[I]mposition and enforcement of sentencing conditions must satisfy the requirements of due process 
and ‘must not . . . amount to overreaching or a denial of a defendant’s entitlement to fundamental 
fairness’” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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VI. CONCLUSION
 The plain text and clear purpose of SOMTA illustrate that the legislature 
intended SOMTA to be inextricably intertwined with the criminal process.158 The 
Court of Appeals in Harnett, however, did not carefully examine the language or 
purpose of SOMTA, which notes that the “[c]ivil and criminal processes . . . both 
should be part of an integrated approach,” in reaching its conclusion that SOMTA is 
a collateral consequence, and, therefore, need not be disclosed.159 Harnett also failed 
to adequately account for the interrelationship between the criminal and civil 
proceedings and, therefore, underestimated the importance of statistical data 
regarding the possibility of civil confinement or strict and intensive supervision. 
Further, the Harnett court’s reliance on Gravino in concluding that SOMTA was a 
direct consequence is misplaced.
 Padilla challenges the Harnett court’s categorical approach and highlights the 
constitutional rights at stake in the context of mandating disclosures.160 By 
questioning the efficacy of applying a categorical analysis to disclosures, the Court in 
Padilla inherently challenges whether Harnett ’s reliance on such a classification is, in 
fact, valid.161 Consequences that are categorically similar to deportation under 
Padilla’s rationale must be disclosed to defendants as part of the plea bargain 
process—SOMTA certainly falls into such a category.162 The Padilla holding also 
raises important constitutional issues regarding an individual’s liberty at stake in 
relation to disclosures.
 Furthermore, State v. Bellamy reinforces the limitations of using a categorical 
approach by bringing into light the importance that fundamental fairness should 
play in the court’s decision. Bellamy notably observed that the severity of consequences, 
such as civil confinement, demand courts to provide such disclosures.163
 The plea bargain process is a fundamental aspect of the criminal judicial 
system.164 Plea bargains provide courts with the essential opportunity to customize 
sentences to each defendant, expedite a defendant’s ability to begin the rehabilitation 
process, reduce the expenses associated with clogged court dockets, and provide law 
enforcement with an opportunity to barter leniency in exchange for valuable 
information.165 Among all of its benefits, the plea bargain process most importantly 
“serves an end to justice.”166 It is essential to plea bargains that notions of fairness are 
inherent to the process to ensure that a defendant is not misinformed about the 
158. See generally Mental Hyg. § 10.01.
159. Id. § 10.01(a); Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 204–05.
160. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238 (N.J. 2003).
164. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 229 (1974).
165. Id.
166. Id.
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agreement in which he is entering.167 The Court of Appeals’s holding in Harnett 
establishes that defendants who enter guilty pleas are not required to know about 
SOMTA, a statute that involves proceedings that could result in severe and 
devastating consequences for a sex offender.168 Without such knowledge, defendants 
are not able to accurately perform the calculus of weighing the certainty of 
consequences in entering a guilty plea against the chances of going to trial. Such a 
degree of certainty relies on the essential due process requirements of knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entering a guilty plea.169 The Harnett decision offends 
this notion of justice because justice truly cannot be obtained when critical 
constitutional protections are compromised.170
167. Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1235.
168. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 207–08 (2011); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
169. N.Y. Crim. Prac. § 12.07(5) (2d ed. 2010).
170. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d at 233–34.
